This study presents an adapted model of 2x2 games of strategy to provide arguments for understanding the various levels of interaction between the parties during negotiations and attempts to identify the strategic structures of the integration process of the CEECS into the EU. Constructs are accordingly identified from game theory and economic theory and integrated. The research model builds on the existing analytical framework developed in the works of Aggarwal and Allan, Aggarwal and Cameron, Brams and Kilgour, Conybeare, and Leaps and Grigsby.

     The arguments are elaborated against the background of the interaction pattern of European Union enlargement process and the issue of agricultural negotiations, whose conclusion became effective also for the last two candidate countries – Bulgaria and Romania – in June 2004. The strategic analysis of negotiations addresses first the theoretical framework in which to build a model of bilateral negotiations; then, the model is used to test and predict the possible outcomes of negotiation on specific issues in general, and specifically for the purpose of this study in relation to negotiations on agriculture. Resemblance with other classes of interactions, e.g. debt rescheduling, enforcement of international agreements, and security aspects, indicates the option of considering 2x2 games in an empirical context, an issue that is developed in the section on methodology.